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This paper reopens the debate on the substitutability of dividends and shareholder control 
in mitigating free cash flow concerns, by examining dividend behavior when shareholder 
control is restricted in the firm. We consider the stakeholder-oriented governance regime of 
the Netherlands, where shareholdings are concentrated, but shareholder rights are often 
severely restricted by a legally imposed governance regime and anti-shareholder devices 
such as Dutch-style poison pills. We find that dividend payouts are generally low, 
unresponsive to earnings changes and show little relationship with size, leverage, and 
investment opportunities. Shareholder power restrictions affect dividend behavior to varying 
degrees, but those that do are used by the vast majority of Dutch listed firms. Once 
accounting for these, we find no evidence that strong shareholders would allow firms to relax 
their dividend policy, as has been proposed in the existing literature. As shareholders, 
institutional investors and managers actually force higher payouts. Thus, it seems that 
dividends often complement rather than substitute shareholders’ efforts to alleviate agency 
concerns. This finding is unlikely to be specific to the Netherlands, and could possibly be 
extended to other stakeholder-oriented governance regimes.  
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How relevant is dividend policy  
under low shareholder protection? 
 
 
Abstract – This paper reopens the debate on the substitutability of dividends and shareholder control 
in mitigating free cash flow concerns, by examining dividend behavior when shareholder control is 
restricted in the firm. We consider the stakeholder-oriented governance regime of the Netherlands, 
where shareholdings are concentrated, but shareholder rights are often severely restricted by a legally 
imposed governance regime and anti-shareholder devices such as Dutch-style poison pills. We find 
that dividend payouts are generally low, unresponsive to earnings changes and show little relationship 
with size, leverage, and investment opportunities. Shareholder power restrictions affect dividend 
behavior to varying degrees, but those that do are used by the vast majority of Dutch listed firms. 
Once accounting for these, we find no evidence that strong shareholders would allow firms to relax 
their dividend policy, as has been proposed in the existing literature. As shareholders, institutional 
investors and managers actually force higher payouts. Thus, it seems that dividends often complement 
rather than substitute shareholders’ efforts to alleviate agency concerns. This finding is unlikely to be 







Black’s (1976) dividend puzzle has sparked a long-standing academic debate on why firms 
distribute huge sums of cash to their shareholders. Existing research has had some success in 
explaining dividend payouts by a variety of market imperfections such as agency problems, 
informational asymmetries, and taxes. Nonetheless, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) argue that 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevance theorem is largely misinterpreted, as even in frictionless 
markets rational expectations require firms to make large payouts. The importance of shareholder 
control in achieving optimal payout levels cannot be sufficiently emphasized. There is evidence that 
strong shareholders actively pursue specific payout outcomes (Allen et al., 2000), and to some extent 
make dividends redundant as a managerial control or monitoring device (La Porta et al., 2000; 
Goergen et al., 2005). That dividends need not be used to contain free cash flow has been argued for 
stakeholder-oriented governance systems in particular, on the basis of the fact that firms in these 
regimes tend to have low and flexible dividend payouts as well as highly concentrated ownership 
structures. 
This paper reopens the debate on the substitutability of dividends and shareholder control in 
mitigating free cash flow concerns, by examining dividend behavior when shareholder control is in 
fact restricted in the firm. The argument that dividends are low in stakeholder-oriented governance 
systems because of concentrated ownership structures is clearly incomplete. It is a well-known fact 
that firms in these regimes tend to adopt anti-shareholder devices that violate the one-share-one-vote 
rule. This may be symptomatic of the fact that they prioritize the interests of other stakeholders over 
the maximization of shareholder value, which may already instigate them to relax their dividend 
policy. If this is indeed the case, there are clearly limits to the extent that dividends can mitigate free 
cash flow unless shareholders are very strong. Of course, firms are unlikely to stop dividend 




payments completely, as long as the option of accessing capital markets remains valuable (Bulow and 
Rogoff, 1989). 
The stakeholder-oriented governance regime of the Netherlands is a natural choice for the 
investigation of these issues, because most publicly listed firms impose particularly severe restrictions 
on shareholder control. Once Dutch firms reach a certain size, they are legally obliged to adopt an 
institutional form known as the structured regime, which automatically strips shareholders from most 
of their rights. In addition, not only do most firms adopt poison pills and golden shares (in the form of 
preference and priority shares), but some also withdraw voting shares and issue tradable non-voting 
depository receipts (certificates). The occurrence of the structured regime and the three anti-
shareholder devices is extremely common; more than 90% of Dutch listed firms restrict shareholder 
power one way or another, and over two thirds have at least two shareholder power restrictions in 
place. 
We use an extension of Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model and random-effects panel probit 
regressions to investigate whether these shareholder power restrictions affect dividend behavior, and 
whether accounting for these challenges the substitutability of dividends and shareholder control as 
alternative control devices. Our initial analysis already detects a number of interesting patterns in 
Dutch dividend behavior. Dividend payouts tend to be low and fairly smoothed, and are unrelated to 
reported earnings. Dutch firms formulate their dividend decisions based on operating cash flows 
instead, presumably to avoid unnecessary liquidity constraints. Also, dividend dynamics show no 
statistical relationship with the severity of agency problems, to the extent that these are reflected in 
firm size, leverage, and investment opportunities (Fama and French, 2001). Thus, it appears that 
Dutch firms interpret dividend policy fairly flexibly and do not use it to mitigate free cash flow 
concerns. In principle, it could be that most firms are already tightly monitored by their concentrated 
shareholders. However, it is equally likely that shareholders are often too weak to enforce optimal 
payout policies. 
Our further results lend more support to this latter argument. Firms that adopt the structured 
regime, and those multinationals that voluntarily retain it despite being exempted, pay lower 
dividends and smooth dividends to a lesser extent. Firms which only have to adopt a mitigated form 
of the regime because they are majority-owned by a foreign shareholder, show signs of being tightly 
monitored but do not relax their dividend behavior. Of the anti-shareholder devices, only preference 
shares relax dividend policy, by simultaneously diluting the voting and cash flow rights of 
shareholders to the benefit of management-friendly third parties. This however is a major issue, 
because more than two thirds of our sample firms use these securities. In fact, that dividend policy is 
changed in firms under the full and voluntary structured regimes is largely due to the fact that they 
use preference shares particularly often. 
In light of these conditions, it is not surprising that we find no evidence that concentrated 
shareholders would allow firms to relax their dividend policy further. Rather, financial institutions 
and managers who efficiently mitigate agency problems as shareholders, actually force higher 
payouts. In other words, it seems that dividends often complement rather than substitute shareholders’ 
efforts to alleviate agency concerns. This finding is unlikely to be specific to the Netherlands, and 
could thus be extended to other stakeholder-oriented governance regimes. Without controlling for the 
impact of shareholder power restrictions, our analysis confirms Gugler and Yurtoglu’s (2003) result 
for Germany that the dividend payout ratio and the extent of dividend smoothing decrease in the 




equity share of the largest shareholder. Thus, it could be that accounting for shareholder power 
restrictions would change some of the conclusions drawn by existing studies on how ownership and 
control structures affect dividend policy. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the 
background literature, describe the Dutch governance regime, and formulate testable conjectures. A 
description of our sample and the methodology employed is provided in Section 3. The empirical 
results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 allows for some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Agency problems, payout policy, and the implications of the Dutch corporate governance 
system 
 
2.1. The agency control function of payout policy 
 
From an agency perspective, corporate payout is generally viewed as a control device that helps 
reduce managerial discretion, and as such is part of the firm’s optimal monitoring/bonding package 
(Rozeff, 1982). Easterbrook (1984) describes how regular dividend payments may force management 
to raise external capital for new projects, thus inflicting market discipline on the firm. Jensen (1986) 
adds that payout reduces free cash flow that managers may otherwise divert for personal use or to 
fund unprofitable projects. Dividends and share repurchases are alternative mechanisms in mitigating 
free cash flow concerns. However, dividends impose a more permanent cash flow commitment; 
managers believe that markets attach a premium to consistent dividend payers and interpret dividend 
cuts as a negative signal (Brav et al., 2005). That managers enter into dividend smoothing has been 
well-documented since Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968), and has been attributed to the 
private control benefits enjoyed by management (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Marsh and Merton 
(1987) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) observe that managers avoid dividend cuts at all costs, 
and prefer to leave dividends unchanged if a dividend increase would likely have to be reversed in the 
future. Accordingly, firms with permanently high operating cash flows tend to pay dividends, while 
those with greater non-operating or more volatile operating cash flows resort more to share 
repurchases (Jagannathan et al., 2000). 
The control function of corporate payout is evidently linked to the severity of the manager-
shareholder conflict. Agency costs are assumed to be lowest in small firms with abundant growth 
prospects (Fama and French, 2001). In these firms, high payouts may lead to excessive reliance on 
external financing, which can exacerbate underinvestment risk (Myers, 1977) and harm the 
incumbent shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005). Agency problems may also be alleviated by 
alternative mechanisms which reduce the marginal control benefits of corporate payout. Fluck (1999) 
develops a model where the amount of dividends depends on the effectiveness of outside shareholders 
in disciplining management. The control function of payout may also be substituted by leverage and 
managerial ownership (Jensen et al., 1992), though the desired relationship with the latter is non-
monotonic due to managerial entrenchment concerns (Schooley and Barney, 1994; Morck et al., 
1988; Fenn and Liang, 2001). 
Regarding the monitoring effectiveness of outside shareholders, several issues warrant 
consideration. Firstly, shareholders have better incentives and ability to monitor management when 




they hold large, concentrated equity blocks (Grossman and Hart, 1980). This suggests that when 
strong shareholders exert their power, dividends need not constitute an additional control device and 
may simply lead to unnecessary liquidity constraints and underinvestment risk (Goergen et al, 2005). 
Country-level studies show some evidence in this regard. Rozeff (1982) and Moh’d et al. (1995) find 
that US firms with less dispersed ownership pay fewer dividends. The presence of strong shareholders 
or their coalitions also lowers payout levels in the UK and weakens the relationship between earnings 
and payout dynamics (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2006). La Porta et al. (2000) provide a cross-
country comparison and show that in the stakeholder-oriented governance regimes of Continental 
Europe where ownership structures are more likely to be concentrated, dividend payouts are generally 
lower and more flexible than in the market-oriented Anglo-American world. 
Secondly, controlling shareholders may be efficient monitors, but like management, they may also 
keep payout levels low to expropriate minority shareholders. Expropriation by insider shareholders is 
more relevant an issue in Continental European countries where the legal protection of minority 
shareholders is low and firms often adopt anti-shareholder devices that violate the one-share-one-vote 
rule (La Porta et al., 2000). Faccio et al. (2001) argue that rational investors may anticipate 
expropriation and demand higher dividends from firms that are more likely to expropriate them. Still, 
minority shareholders may only be able to force higher payouts if they are sufficiently powerful or if 
firms have reputational needs to access capital markets (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Accordingly, 
Faccio et al. (2001) find that in Continental Europe, payouts are higher when multiple large 
shareholders are present. For Germany, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) also report that payout levels 
decrease in the power of the largest shareholder but increase in the power of the second largest 
shareholder. For the UK where the protection of minority shareholders is reasonably strong, 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) do not report such patterns. 
And thirdly, payout levels are not invariant to the identity of the controlling shareholder because (i) 
some shareholder classes may be better monitors than others; and (ii) the payout policies they enforce 
can reflect their specific payout preferences. Financial institutions are often credited with having a 
comparative advantage in monitoring efficiency (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). This translates into more flexible payout policies in institutionally controlled firms both in the 
UK (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2006) and in Germany (Goergen et al., 2005)1. Still, institutional 
investors tend to expect at least some level of payout, either because they enjoy a preferential tax 
treatment or due to tax asset-liability management considerations (Allen et al., 2000)2. Accordingly, 
they prefer firms to pay dividends but without actually demanding higher payouts (Grinstein and 
Michaely, 2005; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005 and 2006). 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) find that in the UK, payout levels are in fact lowest in firms 
controlled by individual investors. Gugler (2003) reports similar results for Austria, and argues that 
                                                 
1 For Germany, Amihud and Murgia (1997) argue that if banks are also creditors to the firms they control, they 
may also favor lower and more flexible payouts to mitigate bankruptcy risks. 
2 Elton and Gruber (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) report that investors in low tax brackets 
prefer high and those in high tax brackets prefer low dividends. Perez-Gonzalez (2002) later reports that tax 
reforms are followed by payout changes consistent with the tax-induced preferences of the largest shareholders. 
The tax position of major shareholders is shown to have an economically important effect in the UK and 
Canada by Bond et al. (1996) and Eckbo and Verma (1994), respectively. 




individuals are better able and incentivized to monitor firms directly3. Gugler (2003) finds that payout 
levels are highest and smoothed the most in government-controlled firms. He attributes this to a 
double principal-agent problem, whereby steady dividend flows reflect greater managerial discretion 
to defend incumbency rents, and the efforts of ill-monitored politicians, to whom the managers are 
accountable, to keep their electorate happy. Both Gugler (2003) and Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2006) characterize the dividend behavior of firms controlled by other non-financial firms as 
relatively normal. Gugler (2003) argues that these results are consistent with the expected ‘ranking’ of 
shareholder types in how efficiently they mitigate informational asymmetries and managerial agency 
costs. It is then surprising that managerial ownership, which Jensen et al. (1992) regard as an 
alternative control device, does not have a meaningful impact on dividend policy either, as shown by 
Fenn and Liang (2001) for the US and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) for the UK. 
 
2.2. Payout policy in the Netherlands: background and conjectures 
 
The Dutch model of corporate governance, known as the ’polder model’, is a stakeholder-oriented 
insider system typical of Continental European countries. In stark contrast with the shareholder 
orientation of Anglo-American governance regimes, the essence of this model is consensus seeking 
among the firm’s various stakeholders, particularly between employers and employees4. The Dutch 
model fully complies with Franks and Mayer’s (2001) definition of insider systems: the number of 
quoted firms is relatively small, share ownership is highly concentrated, and takeover activity is 
minimal (Cools and van Praag, 2003). Dutch firms are also allowed considerable reporting discretion; 
enforcement is weak and tax accounting is formally separate from financial accounting (Alford et al., 
1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000). 
The peculiarity of the Dutch governance regime lies in the fact that it allows for particularly severe 
restrictions on shareholder power even compared to other insider systems. Once Dutch firms reach a 
certain size, they must switch to an institutional form called the structured (or ‘structuur’) regime. 
The adoption of the structured regime is compulsory for limited liability firms once (i) their 
subscribed capital exceeds 11.4 million, and (ii) they employ at least 100 employees and have a 
legally installed workers’ council in place. The immediate objective of the structured regime is to 
give workers’ councils a role on the supervisory boards of large companies. However, it 
simultaneously strips shareholders of most of their tasks and responsibilities to the benefit of the 
supervisory board. The powers of the supervisory board are almost exhaustive, and include the 
approval of the annual accounts, the election of management and the election of the supervisory board 
itself (by way of co-optation). Shareholders may still vote on dividend policy and takeovers, but 
ultimately retain little role in holding management accountable. Accordingly, firms under the 
structured regime have been shown to smooth earnings more actively, report more conservatively and 
be less likely to meet or beat analyst expectations (Cuijpers et al., 2005). 
                                                 
3 The preference of retail investors for dividends, as documented by Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Graham and 
Kumar (2006), is unlikely to apply to wealthy individuals with concentrated shareholdings. 
4  A polder is a low-lying tract of land enclosed by dikes and often reclaimed from the sea. The term ‘polder 
model’ has been used to describe the (slow) decision making process in Dutch politics, where all parties have to 
be heard. Governance in the Netherlands is characterized by the tri-partite co-operation of employers’ 
organizations, labor unions and the government in the Social Economic Council. Despite criticism, this model 
has often helped to diffuse labor conflicts and avoid strikes.  




The current law establishes a number of exemptions from the full adoption of the structured 
regime. Firms that are majority-owned by foreign entities can adopt a mitigated form of the regime. 
This model maintains co-optation but allows shareholders to vote on the annual accounts and the 
appointment of management. Firms are exempted entirely if they have more than 50% of their 
employees abroad or if they are majority-owned by a Dutch multinational under the structured 
regime. Still, most exempt firms retain a weaker form of the regime voluntarily, because full 
elimination requires a statute amendment which the supervisory board can easily block (De Jong et 
al., 2005). 
Typically of insider governance systems, the vast majority of Dutch firms further restrict the rights 
of minority shareholders by issuing securities that explicitly violate the one-share-one-vote rule. The 
provisions of Euronext Amsterdam allow the use of maximally two of three security types: 
 
• Certificates are tradable depository receipts that carry cash flow rights but no voting rights. 
They are issued in exchange for ordinary voting shares, which are deposited with the issuer, 
the administration office (Stichtingskantoor). The administration office, always friendly to 
management, takes over all voting rights on the withdrawn shares, and usually takes a voting 
majority. 
• Preference shares are Dutch-style poison pills that carry full voting rights. These shares are 
issued under takeover threat to a friendly trust office or outside investor. The purchaser pays 
only 25% of the nominal capital upfront, and the issue size can be up to 50% or even 100% of 
the firm’s outstanding capital. 
• Finally, priority shares are similar to French or British ’golden shares’. They carry special 
voting privileges over issues such as merger approval, public offerings, the appointment of 
board members, charter amendments, and liquidation. They are usually sold to a friendly 
foundation. 
 
De Jong et al. (2005) report that both the full and voluntary forms of the structured regime and 
each anti-shareholder device are associated with lower firm values as measured by Tobin’s Q. In most 
cases, these mechanisms are used cumulatively, thus shareholder power tends to be severely 
weakened in Dutch firms. Accordingly, annual shareholder meetings are met with a great deal of 
apathy in terms of attendance, and management-sponsored proposals, including recommendations on 
payout policy, are rarely contested5. 
 
2.2.1. The impact of shareholder power restrictions on payout policy 
We expect a great deal of variation in the extent to which the various shareholder power 
restrictions affect dividend behavior. An important distinction must first be made among the various 
forms of the structured regime. We have mentioned that the structured regime still allows 
shareholders to vote on dividend policy. However, management recommendations on dividend 
payouts are typically put to vote in conjunction with other management-sponsored proposals and are 
almost always passed. Overall, this dictates that under the structured regime, dividend payouts should 
                                                 
5 De Jong et al. (2004) examine 245 annual meetings between 1998 and 2002. They find that only 30% of 
shareholders were present at each meeting on average. Shareholders did not sponsor a single proposal, and of 
1,583 management-sponsored proposals only 9 were rejected or withdrawn.  




be relatively low and unsmoothed. Still, only under the full and voluntary forms of the regime are 
agency problems expected to be severely amplified. Under the mitigated regime, managers remain 
tightly controlled because (i) shareholders maintain the right to vote on the appointment of managers 
and (ii) the foreign majority owner has powerful monitoring incentives. Then, dividend payouts may 
be low and unsmoothed, but this may simply reflect the controlling shareholder trading off free cash 
flow concerns against the risk of underinvestment. Overall, we conjecture that firms under the 
structured regime are less likely to pay dividends, and the dividends they pay are relatively low and 
unsmoothed. The reduction in dividends and dividend payout probability is greatest under the full 
and voluntary forms of the regime, and relatively smaller under the mitigated regime. 
Of the anti-shareholder devices, preference shares should have the most severe impact on dividend 
policy. An important attribute of these securities is that they simultaneously dilute the voting and cash 
flow rights of common shareholders, leaving them with little power to force optimal payouts. The 
holders of preference shares are also unlikely to demand high dividends, both because they are 
management-friendly and because preference shares are cheap to acquire with only 25% of the 
nominal value payable upfront. We therefore conjecture that firms using preference shares are less 
likely to pay dividends, and the dividends they pay are relatively low and unsmoothed. Certificate 
users have better incentives to maintain dividend payments, because these instruments only carry cash 
flow rights. Effectively, dividends may here be considered as compensation to the certificate holders 
who have given up their voting rights. We thus conjecture that firms using certificates are more likely 
to pay dividends, and the dividends they pay are relatively high and smoothed. Finally, we expect 
priority shares to have the least pronounced effect on dividend behavior. These securities may relax 
pressure on management to reimburse shareholders, but they otherwise obstruct shareholder control 
over specific issues unrelated to dividend payout. Thus, we conjecture that the use of priority shares 
leaves dividend behavior unchanged. 
 
2.2.2. The impact of ownership structure on payout policy 
A complementary prediction on dividend policy, already made for the mitigated structured regime, 
is that dividends are low and flexible provided that an incumbent shareholder with powerful 
monitoring incentives is present. This argument recognizes that dividends need not constitute an 
additional control device when alternative mechanisms are at work, and thus may simply lead to 
unnecessary liquidity constraints and underinvestment risk. Still, the incumbent shareholder may keep 
dividends low to expropriate minority shareholders. Consequently, strong minority shareholders may 
force higher payouts to mitigate expropriation risk. We thus conjecture that the probability of 
dividend payouts and the level and smoothing of dividend payments (i) decreases in the equity stake 
of the largest shareholder and (ii) increases in the equity stake of the second largest shareholder. 
We conjecture that the identity of the major shareholders affects dividend behavior in the 
same way that the existing literature documents for other countries. We expect the impact of 
institutional ownership to be two-fold. On one hand, the marginal control benefits of 
dividends should be particularly low when institutional investors make use of their superior 
monitoring skills. On the other, financial institutions are likely to have a greater preference 
for systematic dividend payouts than do other shareholders, due to their preferential tax 
treatment and/or permanent cash flow needs. While capital gains are not taxed in the 




Netherlands, pension funds are also tax-exempt on dividend income. Banks and insurance 
funds are taxed at 35% on dividends, but they may still demand permanent cash flow streams 
due to tax asset-liability management considerations. Overall, we conjecture that firms 
controlled by financial institutions are more likely to be dividend payers, and pay 
unsmoothed but not lower dividends. 
For other shareholders we do not expect tax clientele effects, especially as dividend income is 
always at a tax disadvantage relative to capital gains (expect for the government)6. Rather, we 
conjecture that dividend behavior is predicted simply by the relative level of agency costs under the 
control of each shareholder type. The marginal control benefits of dividends should be lowest in firms 
controlled by wealthy private individuals with strong monitoring skills and incentives, and also 
reduced to some extent under control by other non-financial firms. Thus, we conjecture that firms 
controlled by individual investors and non-financial firms are less likely to pay dividends, and the 
dividends they pay are relatively low and unsmoothed. Similar patterns should persist in the payout of 
firms controlled by managers or supervisory board members, to the extent that insider ownership 
helps mitigate managerial agency problems. Conversely, the double principal-agent problem dictates 
that government-owned firms are more likely to pay dividends, and that the dividends they pay are 
relatively high and smoothed over time. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Our sample covers Dutch firms listed on Euronext Amsterdam and the new market NMAX over 
the period between 1996 and 2004. We exclude banks, insurance companies and other financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6900), because their financial reporting standards are different from those of the rest 
of the sample. We also exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), because their payout policies and 
access to external financing are regulated. Finally, we retain only those firms that are present for at 
least three years of the sample period in the Worldscope Disclosure dataset and the yearly stock 
exchange guide Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen. The final sample contains 150 firms with a 
total of 962 firm years, representing more than two thirds of Dutch listed non-financial firms and 
around 90% of the market capitalization of the Amsterdam Exchanges. Accounting data on each firm 
is gathered from the Worldscope database. To determine whether the firms operate under a particular 
type of the structured regime and whether they use anti-shareholder devices, we consult the Kluwer 
book Monitoring Corporate Governance in Nederland 1998. For those firms not included in this 
volume, we consult the annual reports. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics in constant 2004 prices. The results show that the 
market value of the median firm is relatively high at 269.8 million. There is also considerable 
skewness in firm size; the mean market value is much higher still at 2.8 billion, driven by 
multinationals such as Royal Dutch Shell, Philips Electronics and Akzo Nobel. The mean and median 
                                                 
6 Dividend income of Dutch private individuals in the Netherlands is taxed progressively on small 
shareholdings, but at a flat tax rate of 25% on blockholdings of 5% or more. 




book values of total assets are 2.0 billion and 274.1 million, respectively. It is notable that the while 
the average Tobin’s Q is 1.07, the median Tobin’s Q is below unity at 0.68, largely owing to the 
relative underperformance of Euronext Amsterdam after March 2000. Still, the typical firm is 
reasonably profitable with a net income of 10.9 million and a return on assets (ROA) of 5.19%. The 
median level of operating cash flow is also relatively high at 21.6 million. The sample firms tend to 
be moderately levered, with the median debt-to-assets ratio at 0.23. Dividends are paid in 758 of the 
962 firm years, and typically amount to 5.4 million. 
  
(Insert Table 1) 
 
Table 2 examines the dividend behavior of the sample firms in greater detail. The results show that 
the proportion of dividend payers has been on the decline since the mid-1990s, falling from 88.0% in 
1996 to 74.4% in 2004. The payout ratios of the dividend payers follow a cyclical pattern. During the 
stock market rally between 1996 and 2000, dividends as a percentage of net income declined 
continually from an average 31.7% to 21.7%. Thereafter, the payout ratios picked up again 
notwithstanding a temporary fall in 2002, and reached 37.3% in 2004. These patterns are not unlike 
those reported for the US, where dividend payouts were on the decline during the 1990s (Fama and 
French, 2001) but rebounded after the stock market decline during the early years of the current 
decade (Julio and Ikenberry, 2004)7. Dividend payouts as a percentage of operating cash flows exhibit 
similar trends but are generally more stable. Over the whole sample period, dividend payers paid out 
an average 27.3% of their net income and 17.5% of their operating cash flows. For the aggregate 
sample of payers and non-payers, the same figures come to 20.6% and 13.6%, respectively. In their 
cross-country study, La Porta et al. (2000) report similar numbers for 1994, and conclude that Dutch 
firms generally pay lower dividends than do firms in the market-oriented governance regimes of the 
Anglo-American world. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
Table 3 illustrates the occurrence of shareholder power restrictions among the sample firms. The 
figures suggest that shareholder control tends to be severely limited in the Netherlands. Of the 150 
firms, only 14 impose no limitations on shareholder rights, by neither operating under the structured 
regime nor using anti-shareholder devices. Nearly two thirds of the sample firms operate under the 
structured regime; the full and mitigated forms of the regime are legally imposed in 65 and 8 cases, 
respectively, while 24 firms retain the regime voluntarily. A staggering 126 firms employ anti-
shareholder devices, and 70 use more than one. The use of preference shares (107) is by far the most 
common, followed by certificates (46) and priority shares (43)8. Firms under each form of the 
structured regime are more likely to use and combine these securities, imposing cumulative 
restrictions on shareholder control. 
 
                                                 
7 There is even evidence that the aggregate real dividends paid continued to increase even as the proportion of 
dividend payers was falling, much in the same way that DeAngelo et al. (2004) document for the US. 
8 The use of the three anti-takeover devices is not correlated significantly, except a very mild negative 
correlation between priority shares and certificates. 




(Insert Table 3) 
 
3.2. Share ownership 
 
We hand-collect data on the ownership of the sample firms from the various editions of Handboek 
Nederlandse Beursfondsen. As these handbooks were published bi-yearly prior to 1999, we assign 
ownership changes to the correct year using information from the annual reports. Equity block 
ownerships exceeding 5% are classified into seven mutually exclusive categories: (i) financial 
institutions (banks, insurance firms, investment and pension funds, venture capitalists); (ii) 
independent individuals; (ii) the government; (iv) non-financial firms; (v) executive directors and 
their families; (vi) supervisory board members and their families; and (vii) administration offices. 
Individual and institutional investors are classified into the various categories based on Handboek 
Nederlandse Beursfondsen, the Amadeus database and the annual reports. 
To approximate the influence of the various shareholder types on corporate decision making, we 
follow Crespi and Renneboog’s (2003) approach and construct a two-stage voting game. In the first 
stage, all shareholders of a particular type (e.g. all financial institutions) form a coalition. In the 
second stage, such coalitions participate in a voting game where the payout policy is decided upon. 
The two-stage approach advocated here is relevant due to similarities in the payout preferences and 
monitoring efficiency of investors of the same type. For instance, we have mentioned that 
institutional investors are generally regarded as having a greater relative preference for dividends over 
capital gains than do other investor types. 
We use two alternative measures of shareholder influence: ownership concentration and Banzhaf 
power indices (Banzhaf, 1965). Banzhaf indices are voting power measures obtained by modeling 
voting games with policy-seeking motives (I-power). Recent empirical research has often used 
Shapley values instead to measure shareholder power (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Milnor and 
Shapley, 1978). However, Leech (2002) argues that Shapley values are inappropriate in the context of 
shareholder voting, because they model voting games with the prize being the power itself (P-
power).9 As the shareholder voting games can be regarded as oceanic, we employ a generalization of 
the Banzhaf value proposed by Dubey and Shapley (1979). Under some regularity conditions, such 
oceanic Banzhaf indices are calculated by taking the values for a modified, finite game consisting 
only of the major players, and making an appropriate adjustment for the required majority threshold 
(Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). Throughout our later analysis, both the ownership variables and 
Banzhaf indices are lagged by one period. We deem this necessary to eliminate any simultaneity bias, 
because specific payout policies may inherently attract investor clienteles and thus lead to 
endogeneity problems. 
The ownership structures and corresponding Banzhaf power indices of the sample firms are 
summarized in Table 4. The data show that ownership concentration is very high among Dutch listed 
firms, corresponding to similar figures reported for Germany by Correia da Silva et al. (2004). The 
largest blockholder holds the majority of ordinary shares in 47.7% of the 962 observations, and 
controls at least 25% of the shares in 77.3% of observations. Other shareholders tend to be weak. A 
                                                 
9 A detailed discussion about the differences in I- and P-power and the most appropriate voting games can be 
found in Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 




second largest blockholder is present in 50.2% of observations, but only in 8.4% of all cases does it 
hold a blocking minority of at least 25%, a regulatory threshold in the Netherlands. A third largest 
blockholder is present in 14.8% of all observations. The mean value of the Banzhaf power indices is 
98.6% for the largest blockholder, and only 0.2% for both the second and third largest blockholders. 
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
The results show that financial institutions constitute the most powerful class of shareholders. 
Institutional investors hold equity blocks in 60.0% of observations, and their coalitions have a mean 
Banzhaf index of 34.8% despite holding only 13.8% of ordinary shares on average. The other 
powerful class of outside investors is non-financial firms, which hold equity blocks in 39.5% of all 
observations, and have an equity share of 12.7% and a Banzhaf index of 20.6% on average. The 
frequent use of certificates also lends a great deal of authority to administration offices. Certificates 
are issued by less than a third of Dutch firms, but those that do tend to withdraw the majority of their 
ordinary shares. As a result, administration offices have an average equity share of 22.0% and a mean 
Banzhaf index of 27.2%. The influence of other shareholder groups on corporate decision making is 
considerably smaller. Independent individuals tend to be minority investors; they hold equity blocks 
in 13.6% of observations, but have a mean equity share of just 2.2% and a mean Banzhaf index of 
4.1%. Similarly, executive directors and supervisory board members hold equity blocks in 13.0% and 
6.4% of all cases, respectively, but their share of ownership and the corresponding Banzhaf indices 
are comparatively low. The government has relatively few equity interests, though it has a blocking 




We conduct a two-stage multivariate analysis to investigate how dividend behavior is affected by 
shareholder power restrictions, ownership structures and other firm characteristics. First, we explain 
the likelihood that a firm pays dividends using random-effects panel probit regressions. In these 
models, the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm paid dividends in a particular year and 0 otherwise. 
The basic model includes a fixed set of regressors to control for firm-specific characteristics that 
include ROA, firm value, leverage, and investment opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q. In 
addition, we employ indicator variables corresponding to each shareholder power restriction and their 
interactions with ROA, and later include the ownership variables defined above. We also control for 
industry-specific and year-specific effects. 
In the second stage, the actual dynamics of dividends are analyzed using an extension of Lintner’s 
(1956) partial adjustment model. Lintner assumes that firms maintain a target payout ratio, and adjust 
(‘smooth’) payout only gradually to earnings shocks over several years. For any year t the dividend 
payout of firm i is assumed to be related to earnings it by a desired payout ratio i: 
(1) *it i itD τ= ⋅Π . 
In year t, firm i adjusts to the target dividend payout only partially, such that: 
(2) *, 1 , 1( )it i t i i it i t itD D D Dα δ ε− −− = + ⋅ − + , 




where i is a constant, , 1it i tD D −−  is the actual change in dividends, 
*
, 1it i tD D −−  is the desired change 
in dividends, i is the speed of adjustment and it is the error term. Rearranging (2) and substituting 
(1) into (2) then yields 
(3) , 1(1 )it i i i t i i it itD Dα δ δ τ ε−= + − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅Π + . 
 
Our empirically testable model is formulated using (3) such that 
(4) 1 , 1 2it i i t it itD Dα β β ε−= + ⋅ + ⋅Π + , 
where αi is the firm-specific effect, β1, and β2 are model parameters, and εit is the error term. Here, 






, while the speed of adjustment is 11iδ β= − , or 
correspondingly the extent of dividend smoothing is 1. It is useful to point out that the target payout 
ratio increases in both the ’smoothing’ coefficient β1 and the ‘impact’ coefficient β2. As before, we 
add to the basic model a fixed set of regressors to control for firm-specific characteristics i.e. firm 
size, leverage and Tobin’s Q, and also control for industry and year effects. In order to test our 
conjectures pertaining to the impact of shareholder power restrictions and ownership structures, we 
later include as regressors interactions of the governance dummies and ownership variables with both 
Di,t-1 and it. Then, the sums of the smoothing and impact coefficients on Di,t-1 and it, respectively, 
define the target payout ratios and smoothing levels associated with each restriction and ownership 
characteristic. 
The above partial adjustment specification constitutes a set of dynamic panel data models with the 
lagged dependent variable included as a regressor. Baltagi (2001) finds that in such a framework, 
traditional estimators such as the fixed-effects within-estimator may lead to severe biases in those 
specifications in particular where the time dimension of the panel is fairly small. Several GMM-type 
estimators have been proposed as more suitable alternatives. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a 
simple estimator based on a first-differenced equation where the differences are instrumented by 
lagged levels of the regressors. Blundell and Bond (1998) later improve on this estimation technique 
by including lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels (in 
addition to using levels as instruments for the differences). We estimate the models applying this so-
called GMM-in-systems estimator, using Stata’s xtabond2 module.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. General patterns in dividend behavior 
 
We begin our empirical analysis by observing some general patterns in Dutch dividend behavior. 
The probit and partial adjustment models in their basic form are depicted in Table 5 as Model 1a in 
Panel A and Model 1b in Panel B, respectively. The probit regression in Model 1a shows that Fama 
and French’s (2001) predictions on the drivers of dividend payout likelihood also hold for Dutch 
firms. We find that dividend payers, relative to non-payers, tend to be larger, more profitable, less 




levered, and have fewer growth opportunities. This suggests that the probability of a dividend payout 
increases in the severity of agency problems. 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
However, the partial adjustment model in Model 1b shows some striking peculiarities in the actual 
dynamics of dividend payout. We had to specify the model using operating cash flows rather than net 
income, because the latter shows no statistical relationship with dividends. This is a remarkable 
finding which contradicts Lintner’s (1956) hypothesis that firms determine their desired payout ratios 
as a function of their after-tax earnings. Goergen et al. (2004) find that operating cash flows better 
predict dividends in Germany as well10. The authors propose two possible explanations for this result. 
On one hand, firms may shield their income from dividend commitments, and instead formulate their 
dividend decisions based on cash flows. On the other, it is possible that dividends are set as a function 
of earnings, but the published earnings figures are conservative and smoothed over time. For the 
Netherlands, the latter argument is weakened somewhat by the high earnings volatility reported in 
Table 1. 
Secondly, it is notable that payout levels show no statistical relationship with firm size, leverage, 
and investment opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q. These results cast considerable doubt on the 
role of dividends in mitigating agency concerns in the Netherlands. In principle, this may support the 
argument that dividends need not constitute an additional control device when ownership structures 
are highly concentrated. However, it may equally indicate that shareholders are simply too weak to 
enforce payout policies that optimize shareholder value (La Porta et al., 2000). Table 3 has shown that 
this is not an unreasonable assumption; over 90% of our sample firms limit shareholder rights in some 
way and more than two thirds impose cumulative restrictions on shareholder power. 
And thirdly, it is noteworthy that the implied target payout ratio predicted by the partial adjustment 
model is considerably higher than those observed empirically. In Model 1b of Panel B, the implied 





), which is a substantial departure from the 
average 13.6% reported in Table 2. The dividend smoothing practices of Dutch firms are insufficient 
to explain this discrepancy. In the model, the level of dividend smoothing is relatively high at 1=0.74 
(the speed of adjustment is correspondingly low at 1–0.74=0.26), which is comparable to that 
reported for Germany by Goergen et al. (2004). Still, it is likely that dividend policy in the 
Netherlands is largely driven by other determinants that Model 1b does not control for. This further 
justifies extending our analysis by investigating the impact of shareholder power restrictions and 
ownership structures on dividend behavior. 
 
4.2. The impact of shareholder power restrictions on dividend behavior 
 
4.2.1. The likelihood of dividend payout 
The impact of shareholder power restrictions on dividend behavior is illustrated by Models 2 to 4 
in the two panels of Table 5. The economic effects and how they correspond to the conjectures 
                                                 
10 Goergen et al. (2004) find that the relationship between net income and dividends only holds when the 
regression simultaneously controls for cash flow. Our results are invariant to such alternative specifications. 




formulated in Section 2.2.1. are then summarized in Table 6. In Panel A of Table 5, Model 2a shows 
how each form of the structured regime affects the likelihood of a dividend payout. Contrary to our 
prior conjecture, the imposition of the full structured regime does not significantly reduce the 
propensity of firms to pay dividends. Furthermore, the large, internationally diversified firms that 
voluntarily retain the regime are actually more likely to opt for a dividend payout. These results 
suggest that firms under the full and voluntary forms of the structured regime avoid expropriating 
shareholders entirely. This corresponds to Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989) argument that firms moderate 
expropriation if there is sufficient uncertainty about their future cash flows such that the option to 
access capital markets is always valuable. It is likely that this option is more valuable for the 
multinationals under the voluntary regime, because they tend to be more exposed to international 
capital markets. Also, these firms have relatively more dispersed ownership structures, which implies, 
in the spirit of Goergen et al. (2005), that they should be more inclined to uphold dividend payments. 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
The payout propensity of firms under the mitigated structured regime exhibits different patterns 
that are consistent with tight control by the foreign majority owner. We confirm that these firms are 
less likely to pay dividends, but their payout likelihood is tied particularly strongly to profitability 
(the interaction term is significant at the 1% level). This suggests that the controlling shareholder 
remains sufficiently strong to enforce payout policies that optimally balance free cash flow problems 
and underinvestment risk. 
Model 3a shows how payout likelihood is affected by the use of preference shares, priority shares 
and certificates. Interestingly, none of these anti-shareholder devices reduce the propensity of firms to 
pay dividends. This again suggests that the need for capital market access deters firms from stopping 
dividend payments completely. Still, the various securities do affect the extent to which payout 
likelihood is driven by profitability. To that end, each of our prior conjectures is confirmed. Firstly, 
the payout propensity of firms using preference shares declines rather than increases in ROA, which 
seems to be symptomatic of agency problems. Secondly, there is some indication that firms using 
certificates are more likely to pay dividends at higher levels of profitability. In Model 3a, the 
coefficient on the interaction of the certificate dummy and ROA is insignificant. However, it becomes 
significant at the 10% level in Model 4a which controls for both the anti-shareholder devices and each 
form of the structured regime. And thirdly, priority shares have no discernible impact on payout 
likelihood. 
 
4.2.2. The dynamics of dividend payout 
How the actual dynamics of dividend payout are affected by shareholder power restrictions is 
shown in Panel B of Tables 5 and 6. Model 2b first illustrates the impact of each form of the 
structured regime. Our prior conjectures are confirmed for firms under the full and voluntary forms of 
the regime. Firstly, these firms smooth their dividend payouts to a lesser extent. When the structured 
regime is not imposed, the smoothing coefficient on Di,t-1 is 1=0.80. Under the full and voluntary 
forms of the regime, this smoothing coefficient is reduced by 0.43 and 0.48, respectively. Secondly, 
the full and voluntary forms of the regime decrease the target payout ratio, i= 45.0% in firms not 
under the regime, by 37.1% and 36.2%, respectively. When the full regime is imposed, this decrease 




is driven by a reduction in both the smoothing coefficient 1 and the impact coefficient 2; under the 
voluntary regime, the change in the impact coefficient is negative but insignificant. That dividend 
policy is overall different under the full and voluntary regimes, is confirmed by the Wald statistics on 
the joint significance of the changes in the smoothing and impact coefficients. 
That the structured regime instigates a reduction in the target payout ratio and the extent of 
dividend smoothing is not confirmed statistically for the mitigated form. Model 2b shows that when 
the mitigated regime is imposed, the smoothing coefficient is lower by 0.59 and the target payout 
ratio by 23.5%, but the reductions are insignificant. This suggests that tight control by the foreign 
majority owner mitigates the exacerbation of agency problems induced by the expropriation of 
shareholder rights under the structured regime. 
The impact of the anti-shareholder devices on dividend dynamics is illustrated by Model 3b in 
Tables 5 and 6. As predicted, the use of preference shares reduces the smoothing coefficient by a 
substantial 0.62 and the target payout ratio by 19.7%. Certificates and priority shares do not induce a 
significant change in dividend behavior overall, as indicated by the Wald tests, but the change in the 
target payout ratio appears to be negative for certificates and positive for priority shares. That firms 
using certificates do not pay higher dividends, or indeed smooth dividends more, shows that the 
certificate holders deprived of their voting rights are not paid higher compensation. In the case of 
priority shares, the insignificant positive change in the target payout is driven by a significant increase 
in the impact coefficient. This result coincides with our prior conjecture that these devices do not 
intensify free cash flow concerns. 
The final Model 4b in Tables 5 and 6 shows that the relaxed dividend policy of firms under the full 
and voluntary structured regimes is actually driven by their strong preference for anti-shareholder 
devices. It is critical that of the firms under each regime, preferences shares are used by 83% and 
75%, respectively, and the same firms are also more likely to issue certificates. When we control for 
these devices in Model 4b, the results still suggest that dividend policy is changed under the full and 
voluntary regimes, but the reduction in the target payout ratio declines to just 0.8% and 3.0%, 
respectively. 11 Also, we now find that the source of the change in dividend behavior is different in the 
two regimes. Under the full regime, the impact coefficient is reduced, moving the target payout ratio 
downwards. However, the smoothing coefficient is actually higher, thus all else equal, these firms 
smooth dividends relatively more. For firms which retain the regime voluntarily, we find the opposite 
results: the impact coefficient is now higher but the smoothing coefficient remains reduced. It is 
difficult to fully motivate these findings; we would expect that the Dutch multinationals under the 
voluntary regime would smooth dividends relatively more because of their greater reliance on global 
capital markets. Still, from the perspective of minority shareholders it is irrelevant whether the full 
and voluntary regimes change dividend behavior by themselves, or through the greater occurrence of 
the anti-shareholder devices. In Model 4b, the imposition of the mitigated structured regime still has 
no impact on dividend policy. The effects of the various anti-shareholder devices, and of preference 
shares in particular, also persist. The only qualitative difference with Model 3b is that priority shares 
now also reduce the smoothing coefficient, but their impact on the target payout remains 
insignificantly positive. 
                                                 
11 The correlations between each form of the structured regime and the use of the anti-shareholder devices are 
low (in each case, they do not exceed 0.2) such that they do not induce multicollinearity in the model. 





4.3. Payout policy and the allocation of share ownership 
 
For Germany, Goergen et al. (2005) contend that in the presence of a strong shareholder, there is 
no need for dividends to constitute an additional control device. In the Netherlands, however, high 
payouts may still be necessary, exactly because two thirds of publicly listed firms fall under the 
structured regime and an additional 11% use two or more anti-shareholder devices. Still, the above 
sections have shown that dividend payouts tend to be low, and are even reduced in those firms where 
agency problems are potentially the worst. Therefore, it seems that many Dutch firms relax their 
dividend behavior voluntarily rather than because powerful shareholders allow them to do so. 
In light of these conditions, it is important to see whether specific ownership and control structures 
still affect dividend behavior in the way that earlier studies document. For example, we have found no 
evidence that the argument of Goergen et al. (2005) would hold for firms under the mitigated 
structured regime. That the foreign majority owner tries to enforce an optimal payout policy is 
supported by the fact that payout probability is tied particularly closely to profitability in these firms. 
However, it is remarkable that the same firms neither pay lower dividends nor smooth dividends to a 
lesser extent. This suggests that firms without such a dominant shareholder have already relaxed their 
dividend behavior, such that allowing payouts to be relaxed further would not be optimal. 
In the spirit of the conjectures formulated in Section 2.2.2, the two aspects of ownership and 
control structures we investigate are (i) ownership concentration in the hands of the two largest 
shareholders and (ii) the influence of specific shareholder classes. In the first case, shareholder 
influence is measured simply by the percentage of ownership. In the second, we use two alternative 
measures: the percentage of ownership and the Banzhaf power indices described in Section 3.2. It 
may be that the two measures give different results. The Banzhaf indices assume active policy 
seeking, but they do not account for the fact that concentrated outside shareholders may be more 
motivated to exert influence. This is likely to be an important consideration in the Netherlands where 
shareholder participation is generally low. Using ownership concentration to measure shareholder 
influence should control for this, assuming that the greater the equity share of the shareholders, the 
greater their incentives to enter into policy seeking. It will be interesting to see how the two measures 
compare when insider ownership by executive directors and supervisory board members is 
considered. Using the Banzhaf indices to quantify the relative influence of the two largest 
shareholders makes less sense. Table 4 showed that in the Netherlands, the Banzhaf index of the 
largest shareholder is almost always unity, leaving other shareholders with close to no influence. 
 
4.3.1. The impact of ownership concentration 
The impact of ownership and control structures on dividend policy is illustrated in Table 7 and 
summarized in Table 8. As before, Panels A and B consider the likelihood of a dividend payout and 
the actual dividend dynamics, respectively. In both panels, the first two models show the effect of 
ownership concentration in the hands of the two largest shareholders. The two regressions are 
constructed identically, except only the second model controls for shareholder power restrictions. 
 
(Insert Tables 7 and 8) 
 




A first important finding is that ownership concentration does not have a statistically significant 
impact on payout likelihood. In both Models 1a and 2a of Panel A, the coefficients have the predicted 
sign, but the z-statistics are insignificant in each case. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence that the 
payout likelihood decreases in the equity share of the largest and increases in the equity share of the 
second largest shareholder. 
In Panel B on dividend dynamics, Models 1b and 2b produce strikingly different results. In Model 
1b, both the smoothing and impact coefficients decrease in the equity share of the largest shareholder, 
and the coefficient changes are jointly significant at the 5% level. This suggests that both dividend 
smoothing and the target payout ratio are reduced when a concentrated shareholder exerts control, 
much in the same way that has been reported for Germany by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and for the 
UK by Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006). Unexpectedly, the extent to which dividend behavior is 
relaxed also increases in the equity share of the second largest shareholder. Here, there is an 
insignificant increase in the impact coefficient. However, both the smoothing coefficient and the 
target payout are reduced, and the changes in the impact and smoothing coefficients are jointly 
significant. 
It is remarkable that when we control for shareholder power restrictions in Model 2b, the effect of 
ownership concentration on dividend dynamics virtually disappears. The equity share of the largest 
shareholder remains negatively related to the impact coefficient. However, there is now an 
insignificant increase in the smoothing coefficient, and the implied change in the target payout is 
insignificantly positive. The equity share of the second largest shareholder has an insignificant 
negative effect on both the smoothing and impact coefficients, and also fails to induce a statistically 
significant impact on dividend behavior. Meanwhile, the model confirms that dividend policy is 
strongly affected by the use of preference shares, and to a lesser extent by the full and voluntary 
forms of the structured regime. 
To summarize, these findings have very important economic implications. It seems that in the 
Netherlands, dividend behavior is actually relaxed when shareholder power restrictions (and 
preference shares in particular) are put in place, rather than when large shareholders exert control. In 
other words, there is no evidence that dominant shareholders would deliberately allow firms to relax 
their payout levels to avoid liquidity constraints12. It is possible that this result can also be extended to 
other stakeholder-oriented governance systems. Existing studies have often concluded that in these 
regimes, dividends are low and flexible because large shareholders already mitigate free cash flow 
concerns. However, such payout patterns may simply be symptomatic of the use of anti-shareholder 
devices which ensure that the interests of other stakeholders are prioritized over the maximization of 
shareholder value. It is also unlikely that minority shareholders can prevent expropriation either by 
the other stakeholders or the incumbent largest shareholder, because the second largest shareholder 




                                                 
12 It is possible that large shareholders influence dividend behavior indirectly, by controlling the use of anti-
shareholder devices. However, we only find a mild negative correlation between the equity share of the largest 
shareholder and the use of preference and priority shares (-0.12 and -0.17, respectively). Thus, the results in 
Section 4.3 are not unlikely to be driven by multicollinearity. The correlation matrix is available upon request. 




4.3.2. The impact of the identity of large shareholders 
We now examine whether the identity of the large shareholders still affects dividend behavior 
when shareholder power restrictions are controlled for. The results are shown by the third and fourth 
models in the two panels of Tables 7 and 8. It is useful to recall our prior conjectures based on Gugler 
(2003), Goergen et al. (2005) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006). Each of these studies finds 
that the slack afforded to firms in their dividend policy increases in the expected ‘ranking’ of the 
various shareholder types in terms of their ability to mitigate agency problems. Accordingly, we 
expect that dividends are (i) most flexible when strong institutional or individual investors are 
present, and when insiders hold equity blocks; and (ii) least flexible when the firm is government-
held. The same ranking should also be reflected in the target payout ratios, whereby more efficient 
monitors allow lower payouts, though institutional investors probably dislike too low dividends. 
Panels A in Tables 7 and 8 first demonstrate whether such considerations have an impact on the 
probability of a dividend payout. The results in Models 3a and 4a, which proxy shareholder influence 
using the Banzhaf indices and the percentage of ownership, respectively, can be summarized as 
follows. In both regressions, the payout probability strongly increases in the influence of coalitions by 
financial institutions. Thus, it seems that Dutch firms do try to satisfy the relative preference of 
institutional investors for continuous dividend payments. This effort also appears to be largely 
voluntary, because the Banzhaf indices include those cases where the institutional investors could 
exercise influence, but may not have enough incentives to do so. 
The remaining results show little support to our other conjectures, and in fact the coefficients tend 
not to have the predicted signs. Surprisingly, government-controlled firms appear to be the least likely 
to pay dividends, though the z-statistics are insignificant in both models. Conversely, the payout 
likelihood increases when managers and supervisory board members hold effective control (Model 
3a), but this is not a function of the size of their equity stakes (Model 4a). Individual investors and 
non-financial firms do not seem to exert much influence over the payout likelihood, though the 
coefficient on the Banzhaf index of non-financial firms is positive and weakly significant in Model 
3a. 
The partial adjustment models in Panels B of Tables 7 and 8 deliver some remarkable results. 
Model 3b constructed with the Banzhaf indices indicates that none of the outside shareholder 
coalitions exert influence over dividend policy. The changes in the smoothing and impact coefficients 
are all insignificant, except the impact coefficient is weakly reduced under the influence of non-
financial firms. In Table 8, the coefficient changes are also jointly insignificant in each case. This 
confirms that the equity share of outside shareholders must be sufficiently high to induce them to 
enter into active policy seeking. 
Conversely, when shareholder control is held by insiders, their ownership needs not be highly 
concentrated to affect dividend behavior. When executive directors form a controlling coalition of 
shareholders, there is a strong reduction in the smoothing coefficient and an insignificant increase in 
the impact coefficient. In Table 8, the coefficient changes are jointly significant at the 5% level, 
confirming that dividend behavior is changed under managerial control. What is surprising, however, 
is that we observe a strong increase, rather than a decrease, in the target payout ratio: relative to 
widely-held firms, the target payout of firms under managerial control (with the corresponding 
Banzhaf indices equal to unity) is 13.7% higher. When the strongest shareholders are supervisory 
board members, the results again imply a positive change in the target payout, but the coefficient 




changes are jointly insignificant. Also, we now find a significant increase in the smoothing coefficient 
and a significant decrease in the impact coefficient. That dividend smoothing increases under control 
by supervisory board members may be symptomatic of managerial agency problems. It is possible 
that the monitoring efficiency of the board is crippled by collision between owner and non-owner 
members over the prioritization of shareholder versus stakeholder interests. Alternatively, the 
functioning of the board is unaffected, but the firm now pays systematic payouts due to pressure from 
owner members trying to avoid being expropriated. 
Model 4b of Tables 7 and 8 illustrates how dividend behavior is affected when the equity share of 
each shareholder coalition increases. For insider shareholders, the results of Model 3b are fully 
confirmed. In fact, when supervisory board members acquire larger stakes, the changes in the 
smoothing and impact coefficients become stronger and jointly significant. Thus, it appears that when 
board members become concentrated owners, they instigate the firm to both pay higher dividends and 
smooth dividends more. 
Of the outside shareholders, two types emerge as exerting control over dividend policy. The 
greater the equity stake of institutional investors, the lower the smoothing coefficient and the higher 
the impact coefficient, and the changes in the two are jointly significant at the 1% level. Importantly, 
Table 8 shows a strong overall increase in the implied target payout: at the median level of 
institutional ownership, the target payout is higher by 23.2% relative to widely-held firms. This result 
is likely to reflect the relative preference of institutional investors for dividends. It is also notable that 
the dividend policy changes induced by institutional and managerial ownership are very similar, in 
that dividend smoothing is reduced to avoid liquidity constraints, but otherwise greater pressure is 
placed on the firm to pay out cash. This finding fits in nicely with our earlier result that in the 
Netherlands, concentrated shareholders tend not to allow firms to relax their payout levels further in 
the way that existing studies predict. In fact, it appears that dividends and shareholder control are 
often complementary rather than substitute devices in containing free cash flow. 
Interestingly, the shareholders that do allow lower target payouts are non-financial firms. In Model 
4b, both the smoothing and impact coefficients decrease in the equity share of non-financial firms. 
The changes in the coefficients are jointly significant, and imply a 17.1% reduction in the target 
payout ratio at the median equity stake. It is somewhat surprising that both the extent of dividend 
smoothing and the target payout are virtually unchanged when ownership is concentrated in the hands 
of individual investors and the government. Gugler (2003) finds that in Austria, these two shareholder 
types induce the two most extreme changes in dividend patterns. Overall, this suggests that dividend 
behavior in the Netherlands does not necessarily reflect the ranking of the controlling shareholders in 
how they mitigate managerial agency costs and informational asymmetries. 
 
4.4. Robustness checks and extensions 
 
In order to corroborate the results contained in Tables 5 to 8, we perform a number of robustness 
checks. Alternative measures of profitability, size and financial risk have the same impact (or the lack 
thereof) on dividend behavior as the original control variables, and leave the impact of shareholder 
power restrictions and ownership unaffected. For example, our core results are the same when we 
replace (i) return on assets with return on equity, (ii) the market value of assets with the book value of 
assets or market capitalization, and (iii) the book value of leverage with the market value of leverage 




or interest coverage. It is important to emphasize that none of these variables show a robust statistical 
relationship with dividend dynamics in the partial adjustment models. To the extent that each should 
be indicative of the level of agency problems in the firm, this confirms that dividends play a very 
limited role in mitigating free cash flow concerns in the Netherlands. 
To check for the robustness of the partial adjustment model itself, Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2006) propose various alternative specifications. The authors closely investigate full adjustment 
models (Short et al., 2002) and Waud models (1966), as well as allow the adjustment of dividends to 
earnings changes to be asymmetric (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). In all these papers as well as in our 
analysis, none of these specifications yield materially different results.  
We also try alternative specifications of shareholder control in the regressions shown in Table 7. 
The only interesting results are obtained when we replace the ownership percentages in Model 4b 
with dummy variables that equal 1 if a shareholder has a blocking minority of at least 25%, and 0 
otherwise. By using these dummies, we make the implicit assumption that shareholders with a 
blocking minority already have sufficient incentives to enter into active policy seeking. The new 
results confirm our previous observations on how institutional and insider ownership affects dividend 
behavior. However, we now find no statistical evidence that firms controlled by other non-financial 
firms would either have lower target payouts or smooth dividends to a lesser extent. Also, the results 
now show that government-controlled firms do smooth dividends more, as has been observed by 
Gugler (2003) for Austria. Moreover, they actually have lower target payouts than do both widely-
held firms and those controlled by other shareholders. These results lend further support to our earlier 
conclusion that in the Netherlands, dividends often complement rather than substitute the ability of 
shareholders to contain agency problems. 
We finally examine whether our results on payout behavior persist when we also account for share 
repurchases in addition to dividends. It is possible that Dutch firms trying to avoid permanent cash 
flow commitments simply prefer to reimburse shareholders by repurchasing shares. However, La 
Porta et al. (2000) find that share repurchases are least common precisely in the stakeholder-oriented 
governance regimes where firms already pay low dividends. Indeed, we find no evidence that Dutch 
firms would compensate shareholders by stepping up repurchases. We gather data on share 
repurchases from the SDC and Amadeus databases, the Dutch financial dailies, and published annual 
reports. Of the 962 firm years, only in 54 were shares repurchased, for an average 185.4 million. 
Once combining these transactions with dividends in our payout models, our original results remain. 
It is particularly interesting that the dynamics of total payout continue to show no robust relationship 
with net income, firm size, leverage and Tobin’s Q. There is also little indication that Dutch firms 
switch smoothly between dividends and share repurchases depending on their capacity to make cash 
flow commitments. Random-effects tobit models13 reveal that relative to dividend payers, 
repurchasers are less profitable. However, there is no evidence that they would have greater non-
operating or more volatile operating cash flows (Jagannathan et al., 2000), or that they would be 
smaller, less levered or have a higher Tobin’s Q (Fama and French, 2001). 
                                                 
13 We use double-censored random-effects tobit models to examine the relative popularity of dividends and 
share repurchases. In these models, the dependent variable is the ratio of share repurchases to total payout, but 
their configuration is otherwise identical to that of the random-effects probit models. The results of the tobit 
models are available on request. 




Throughout this paper, we have made some strong statements on the level of agency problems in 
firms based on their dividend behavior. To verify these, it is important to see whether the share prices 
of the same firms also reflect these agency concerns. The Appendix demonstrates how Tobin’s Q is 
affected by shareholder power restrictions and ownership and control structures in a random-effects 
framework. The results provide a welcome extension to our earlier observations and can be 
summarized as follows. Of the various forms of the structured regime, Tobin’s Q is reduced under the 
full form, unchanged under the voluntary form and increased under the mitigated form. That the 
voluntary regime does not reduce Tobin’s Q suggests that the reliance of Dutch multinationals on 
international capital markets increases their incentives for better governance. We also confirm that the 
structured regime does not affect firm valuation per se; the valuation effects of the full and mitigated 
regimes disappear when we control for anti-shareholder devices and the concentration of ownership, 
respectively. Of the anti-shareholder devices, only preference shares lead to reduced firm valuation, 
contrary to the results reported by De Jong et al. (2005). Our findings fit in nicely with the fact that 
only these instruments relax the incentives of firms to pay and smooth dividends. 
The valuation effects of ownership and control structures are broadly consistent with our earlier 
observations. Tobin’s Q increases in the equity share of the largest shareholder but not in the equity 
share of the second largest shareholder. This implies that minority investors in the Netherlands are 
often too weak to prevent expropriation by the incumbent shareholder. Also, it appears that 
concentrated shareholders do have better monitoring incentives. Having observed that the target 
payout does not decrease in the equity share of the largest shareholder in the way that Gugler (2003) 
and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) find, this confirms that strong shareholders in the 
Netherlands simply avoid allowing firms to relax their dividend payouts further.  
Finally, we find that some shareholders are indeed more efficient monitors than others. The 
ranking of the outside shareholders in the extent that Tobin’s Q is affected by the size of their equity 
stake is (i) individual investors, (ii) financial institutions, (iii) non-financial firms and (iv) the 
government. This fully matches Gugler’s (2003) ordering of shareholders in terms of their ability to 
mitigate agency problems and informational asymmetries. Of insider shareholders, only ownership by 
executive directors induces a statistically significant increase in firm valuation. This suggests that 
supervisory board members with equity stakes may indeed be prevented from stepping up the 
maximization of shareholder value, if non-owner members collide with them over the prioritization of 





This paper has investigated whether dividend behavior is affected by shareholder power 
restrictions, and whether accounting for these challenges conventional wisdom on the substitutability 
of dividends and shareholder control in mitigating free cash flow concerns. The corporate landscape 
of the Netherlands is a natural choice for the investigation of these issues, because most publicly 
listed firms impose severe limitations on shareholder control. In fact, many large Dutch firms are 
legally obliged to strip shareholders from most of their power by adopting an institutional form called 
the structured regime. The use of anti-shareholder devices such as preference shares, priority shares 
and certificates is also very common. The adoption of the structured regime only increases the 




occurrence of these, thereby inflicting cumulative restrictions on shareholder control. Under this 
system where the rights of the shareholders are largely confiscated, high dividend payouts may be a 
necessary monitoring device to curb potential agency costs. The question we answer here is whether 
or not firms are still willing to pay high dividends under these conditions, and if not, whether and how 
shareholders exert control depending on their monitoring skills and incentives.  
The analysis presented here shows some interesting patterns in Dutch dividend behavior. Firms 
pay low and moderately smoothed dividends, and formulate their dividend decisions based on 
operating cash flows rather than after-tax earnings. Also, dividend dynamics show no statistical 
relationship with the severity of agency problems, as proxied by firm size, leverage, and investment 
opportunities. Overall, this suggests that Dutch firms interpret dividend policy very flexibly, and do 
not use it to mitigate free cash flow concerns. We argue that this is due to the fact that shareholders 
are often too weak to enforce optimal payout policies. Firms that must adopt the structured regime 
and those that voluntarily retain it pay lower dividends and smooth dividends to a lesser extent. Firms 
which only have to adopt a mitigated form of the regime because they are majority-owned by a 
foreign shareholder, show signs of being tightly monitored and do not change their target payout. Of 
the anti-shareholder devices, only preference shares relax dividend behavior. This is a major issue, 
however, because more than two thirds of Dutch firms use these securities. 
In light of these conditions, it is not surprising that concentrated shareholders tend not to allow 
firms to relax their dividend policy further. We find no evidence that dividends and shareholder 
control would be substitute mechanisms in containing free cash flow in the way that existing studies 
show. Rather, it often seems that dividends complement rather than substitute the efforts of strong 
shareholders to alleviate agency concerns. Importantly, this finding is unlikely to be specific to the 
Netherlands, and could thus be extended to other stakeholder-oriented governance regimes. In other 
words, it could be that accounting for shareholder power restrictions would change some of the 
conclusions drawn by existing studies on how ownership and control structures affect dividend 
policy. 
Overall, the argument that dividend payouts are low in stakeholder-oriented governance systems 
because of concentrated ownership structures is clearly incomplete. We have provided compelling 
evidence that at least in the Netherlands, dividend behavior is relaxed when shareholder power 
restrictions are put in place, rather than when concentrated shareholders exert control. To that end, 
low dividend payouts may simply be symptomatic of the stakeholder orientation of the Dutch 
governance model. It is not unreasonable to assume that many Dutch firms restrict shareholder rights 
to allow management to prioritize the interests of other stakeholders. Then, shareholders are treated 
much like perpetual creditors, where they are offered regular dividends but otherwise have little claim 
over residual cash flows. A large shareholder with strong monitoring skills and incentives may want 
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All numbers are expressed in  thousands at constant 2004 prices. The descriptive statistics on 
dividend payout are conditional on dividends being paid, and are thus computed for 758 firm-years. 
The remaining summary statistics are computed for the full sample of 962 firm-years. Firm value is 
defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt at the end of a given 
year. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of the total assets. 
 
Variables N Mean Median Standard deviation 
Firm value (in  thousands) 962 2,846,821 269,832 13,380,661 
Book value of assets (in  thousands) 962 2,041,846 274,148 7,928,569 
Total debt/Book value of total assets 962 0.25 0.23 0.19 
Tobin's Q 962 1.07 0.68 1.30 
Net income (in  thousands) 962 63,944 10,875 765,154 
Cash flow from operations (CFO, in  thousands) 962 209,016 21,635 1,011,980 
Return on assets (ROA) 962 3.36% 5.19% 14.54% 




Dividend payout ratios 
 
 All firms  Dividend payers only  
 %  of net income % of cash flow  % of net income % of cash flow  Year 
 
N 
Average Median Average Median  
N 
Average Median Average Median  
Dividend 
payers 
(of all firms) 
1996  100 27.0% 30.7% 18.2% 16.5%  88 31.7% 34.0% 20.8% 17.4%  88.0% 
1997  118 22.2% 22.0% 13.3% 12.3%  103 26.0% 27.4% 15.4% 14.4%  87.3% 
1998  124 19.0% 18.0% 14.9% 11.8%  102 23.4% 23.1% 18.2% 14.9%  82.3% 
1999  119 17.9% 15.2% 14.5% 10.9%  93 23.4% 20.3% 18.9% 14.6%  78.2% 
2000  112 15.7% 11.4% 10.6% 8.6%  85 21.7% 19.5% 14.4% 11.7%  75.9% 
2001  106 22.0% 19.8% 13.3% 13.4%  80 31.6% 38.4% 17.9% 20.0%  75.5% 
2002  98 14.6% 14.2% 12.3% 9.6%  73 20.9% 31.8% 16.6% 15.3%  74.5% 
2003  95 22.3% 13.8% 12.3% 9.8%  67 34.8% 36.1% 17.8% 12.9%  70.5% 
2004  90 25.9% 21.5% 12.8% 13.4%  67 37.3% 41.1% 17.6% 16.0%  74.4% 
All  962 20.6% 17.5% 13.6% 11.4%  758 27.3% 28.7% 17.5% 15.2%  78.8% 





Institutionalized restrictions on shareholder power 
 
 Structured regime 
  
Total 
No Yes Full Voluntary Mitigated 
No anti-takeover devices 24 14 10 2 4 4 
Preference shares 107 28 75 54 18 3 
Priority shares 43 10 32 22 7 3 
Certificates 46 12 34 26 7 1 
One device is used 58 23 35 26 8 1 
Preference shares 42 16 26 20 6 0 
Priority shares 8 5 3 1 1 1 
Certificates 8 2 6 5 1 0 
Two devices are used 68 16 50 35 12 3 
Preference/Priority 32 6 24 16 6 2 
Preference/Certificate 33 10 23 16 6 1 
Priority/Certificate 3 0 3 3 0 0 
Three devices are used 2 0 2 2 0 0 
TOTAL 150 53 97 65 24 8 
 
Table 4 
Distribution of shares and voting power 
 
Summary statistics are computed for the pooled sample of 962 firm years. All blockholdings of 5% or more are gathered. The construction of the 
Banzhaf power indices is explained in Section 3.2. 
 




blockholder Mean >50% >25% Mean >50% >25% 
Largest block 962 100.0%  50.5% 47.9% 77.3% 98.6% 97.6% 100% 
2nd largest block 962 49.9%  7.5% 0 8.2% 1.4% 0 0 
3rd largest block 962 15.9%  1.4% 0 0 1.4% 0 0 
Financial institutions 962 60.0% 35.0% 13.8% 5.7% 22.8% 34.8% 33.4% 35.9% 
Non-financial firms 962 39.5% 19.2% 12.7% 10.6% 17.7% 20.6% 19.4% 21.4% 
Independent individuals 962 13.6% 4.0% 2.2% 0.6% 2.9% 4.1% 3.7% 4.4% 
Government 962 3.2% 2.8% 1.4% 1.1% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 
Executive directors 962 13.0% 7.5% 4.5% 3.8% 6.9% 7.5% 7.3% 7.7% 
Supervisory boards 962 6.4% 3.2% 2.2% 2.4% 3.5% 3.4% 3.2% 3.2% 
Administration offices 962 29.9% 27.6% 22.0% 23.3% 27.7% 27.2% 26.6% 27.9% 





The impact of shareholder power restrictions on dividend policy 
 
Panel A contains random-effects panel probit models, where the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm pays dividends in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to the average of total assets at the 
beginning and the end of the year. Firm size is the natural logarithm of firm value i.e. the sum of the market value of equity 
and the book value of debt at the end of a given year. Tobin’s Q is the market-to-book ratio. The book value of leverage is 
the ratio of total debt to the book value of the total assets and is measured at the end of the year. All values are in  
thousands at constant 2004 prices. Panel B contains partial adjustment models where the dependent variable is the value of 
dividend payout in a particular year. The models are estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) GMM-in-systems 
estimator. We use up to two lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the first-differenced equation. Lags of The Z-
statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The Hansen (1982) test of 
overidentifying restrictions verifies the appropriateness of moment conditions imposed in the estimation procedure. The 
autocorrelation test statistics have an asymptotic standard normal distribution. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of dividend payout 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Variables 
Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
Intercept -3.30 -2.28b -2.74 -2.03b -3.33 -2.26b -2.41 -1.98b 
Return of assets (ROAit) 5.42 4.74
a 5.54 3.52a 8.22 3.40a 8.44 3.24a 
Firm size 0.59 5.59a 0.51 5.10a 0.62 5.54a 0.53 5.08a 
Leverage -2.47 -3.74a -2.44 -3.67a -2.42 -3.61a -2.37 -3.50a 
Tobin's Q -0.68 -6.10a -0.79 -6.29a -0.73 -6.21a -0.81 -6.22a 
Full structured regime   -0.06 -0.17   0.09 0.23 
Voluntary structured regime   1.22 2.08b   1.40 2.33b 
Mitigated structured regime   -2.76 -2.70a   -2.73 -2.64a 
ROAit*Full structured regime   0.96 0.42   -0.72 -0.30 
ROAit*Voluntary structured regime   -2.36 -0.85   -4.89 -1.49 
ROAit*Mitigated structured regime   34.16 3.11
a   32.06 2.83a 
Preference shares         -0.24 -0.55  -0.27 -0.69 
Priority shares         -0.25 -0.57  -0.18 -0.44 
Certificates      0.01 0.02 -0.21 -0.55 
ROAit*Preference shares      -5.44 -2.25
b -5.07 -2.06b 
ROAit*Priority shares      2.29 0.99 2.08 0.87 
ROAit*Certificates          3.01 1.33  5.20 1.85
c 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 962 962 962 962 
No. of firms 150 150 150 150 
Wald test (2) 92.02a 92.98a 96.05a 98.41a 
Log likelihood -269.27 -258.27 -265.20 -253.87 
Sigma u 1.64 1.43 1.65 1.42 
Rho  0.73 0.67 0.73 0.67 
LR test of rho=0 176.97a 127.12a 164.64a 115.34a 
         





Panel B: Dividend dynamics 
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Variables 
Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
Lagged dividend (Di,t-1) 0.74 8.81
a 0.80 10.30a 0.83 4.09a 1.33 4.87a 
Operating cash flow (CFit) 0.10 6.86
a 0.09 6.36a 0.04 1.73c -0.04 -1.45 
Di,t-1*Full structured regime   -0.43 -4.01
a   0.20 3.87a 
Di,t-1*Voluntary structured regime   -0.48 -1.74
c   -0.66 -2.52c 
Di,t-1*Mitigated structured regime   -0.59 -0.59   -0.61 -0.87 
CFit*Full structured regime   -0.04 -1.74
c   -0.02 -2.29b 
CFit*Voluntary structured regime   -0.03 -1.18   0.07 2.43
b 
CFit*Mitigated structured regime     0.08 0.25     -0.04 -0.16 
Di,t-1*Preference shares     -0.62 -7.52
a -0.64 -25.55a 
Di,t-1*Priority shares     0.05 0.23 -0.45 -1.74
c 
Di,t-1*Certificates     0.20 0.64 -0.23 -0.73 
CFit*Preference shares     -0.01 -0.80 0.00 0.22 
CFit*Priority shares     0.04 1.70
c 0.11 3.91a 
CFit*Certificates         -0.01 -0.21 0.06 1.30 
Firm size*1000 -23.80 -1.06 -3.74 -0.81 12.46 1.05 8.12 1.01 
Leverage*1000 -65.70 -0.52 -24.38 -0.59 -75.88 -0.93 -56.40 -1.38 
Tobin's Q*1000 -44.72 -0.76 6.99 1.15 -8.41 -1.30 -1.99 -0.46 
Intercept 385795 1.00 64904 1.08 -140385 -0.89 -93029 -0.87 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 962 962 962 962 
No. of firms 150 150 150 150 
p-value of F-test (2) >0.001 >0.001 >0.001 >0.001 
Hansen test 36.89 93.69 129.69 1.5e+06a 
AR(1) test z-statistic -1.28 -1.17 -1.34 -1.21 
AR(2) test z-statistic 1.07 1.10 1.33 1.16 
 





Summary of the impact of shareholder power restrictions on dividend policy 
 
This table presents a summary of dividend payout policy using the estimates of Table 5. For each of the statistically significant 
parameter estimates, we show the estimated size of the deviations from the reference values. In Panel B, the significance of the 
change in the target payout ratio is obtained using Wald tests which determine whether the deviations from 1 and 2 are jointly 
significant. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Nss stands for ‘not statistically significant’. 
 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of dividend payout 
 Dividend likelihood Sensitivity of dividend likelihood to ROA 















Full structured regime - nss  nss - nss  nss 
Voluntary structured regime - 1.22b  1.40b - nss  nss 
Mitigated structured regime - -2.76a  -2.73a - 34.16a  32.06a 
Preference shares -  nss nss -  -5.44b -5.07b 
Priority shares 0  nss nss 0  nss nss 
Certificates +  nss nss +  nss 5.20c 
 
 
Panel B: Dividend dynamics 
 Dividend smoothing: 1 Target payout ratio: 2/(1-1) 















Full structured regime - -0.43a  0.20a - -37.1%a  -0.8%a 
Voluntary structured regime - -0.48c  -0.66c - -36.2%c  -3.0%b 
Mitigated structured regime - nss  nss - nss  nss 
Preference shares -  -0.62a -0.64a -  -19.7%a -25.0%a 
Priority shares 0  nss -0.45c 0  nss nss 
Certificates +  nss nss +  nss nss 
 
 





The impact of shareholder power allocation on dividend policy 
 
Panel A contains random-effects panel probit models, where the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm pays dividends in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise. The construction of the Banzhaf power indices is explained in Section 3.2. Return on 
assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to the average of total assets at the beginning and the end of the year. Firm size is 
the natural logarithm of firm value i.e. the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt at the end of a 
given year. Tobin’s Q is the market-to-book ratio. The book value of leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book value of 
the total assets and is measured at the end of the year. All values are in  thousands at constant 2004 prices. Panel B 
contains partial adjustment models where the dependent variable is the value of dividend payout in a particular year. The 
models are estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) GMM-in-systems estimator. We use up to two lagged levels of the 
regressors as instruments in the first-differenced equation. The Z-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions verifies the 
appropriateness of moment conditions imposed in the estimation procedure. The autocorrelation test statistics have an 
asymptotic standard normal distribution. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of dividend payout 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Voting power measure % of Shares % of Shares Banzhaf index % of Shares 
Variables Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
Intercept -3.59 -2.32b -3.26 -2.18b -5.35 -3.17a -4.45 -2.91a 
Return of assets (ROAit) 5.22 4.56
a 5.24 4.55a 5.30 4.66a 5.42 4.82a 
Firm size 0.60 5.54a 0.58 5.46a 0.61 5.54a 0.63 5.61a 
Leverage -2.49 -3.74a -2.57 -3.97a -2.63 -3.96a -2.67 -4.01a 
Tobin's Q -0.67 -6.00a -0.65 -5.84a -0.65 -5.82a  -0.67 -6.04a 
Largest shareholder -0.13 -0.23 -0.25 -0.41      
2nd largest shareholder 1.78 1.51 1.55 1.33         
Financial institutions     1.74 2.49b 3.08 3.16a 
Individuals     0.87 1.06 -1.07 -0.87 
Government     -0.70 -0.58 -1.79 -0.89 
Non-financial firms     1.18 1.72c 0.85 1.17 
Executive Directors     1.49 1.93c 1.61 1.48 
Supervisory boards         1.89 1.85c  1.34 0.98 
Full structured regime   0.11 0.28 0.15 0.36 -0.04 -0.10 
Voluntary structured regime   1.15 1.87c 1.08 1.77c 1.00 1.69c 
Mitigated structured regime     -0.55 -0.72 -0.83 -1.09 -0.87 -1.19 
Preference shares   -0.47 -1.19 -0.48 -1.19 -0.48 -1.24 
Priority shares   -0.27 -0.66 -0.08 -0.21 -0.09 -0.23 
Certificates     0.15 0.34 1.12 1.73c  0.54 1.25 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 962 962 962 962 
No. of firms 150 150 150 150 
Wald test (2) 92.72a 96.06a 98.62a 99.82a 
Log likelihood -268.58 -265.18 -260.74 -259.74 
Sigma u 1.61 1.50 1.45 1.38 
Rho  0.72 0.69 0.68 0.65 
LR test of rho=0 169.11a 144.14a 120.83a 110.94a 
 





Panel B: Dividend dynamics 
  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
Voting power measure % of Shares % of Shares Banzhaf % of Shares 
Variables Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
Lagged dividend (Di,t-1) 0.82 9.68
a 1.07 5.40a 1.53 6.28a 1.34 7.17a 
Operating cash flow (CFit) 0.10 6.32
a 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.21 
Di,t-1* Largest shareholder -0.60 -1.95
c 0.07 0.23      
Di,t-1* 2
nd largest shareholder -4.49 -2.25b -1.28 -0.98      
CFit* Largest shareholder -0.11 -2.37
b -0.09 -3.10a      
CFit* 2
nd largest shareholder 0.31 0.93 -0.23 -1.09         
Di,t-1*Financial institutions     -0.38 -1.33 -1.08 -3.03
a 
Di,t-1*Individuals     -1.79 -0.96 2.05 0.32 
Di,t-1*Government     -0.09 -0.31 0.15 0.84 
Di,t-1*Non-financial firms     -0.15 -0.44 -1.44 -1.82
c 
Di,t-1*Executive directors     -1.04 -2.47
b -1.73 -2.12b 
Di,t-1*Supervisory boards     0.49 1.90
c 1.37 2.26b 
CFit*Financial institutions     0.01 0.11 0.14 2.30
b 
CFit*Individuals     -0.18 -1.12 -0.41 -1.18 
CFit*Government     -0.01 -0.11 0.07 0.71 
CFit*Non-financial firms     -0.11 -1.75
c -0.23 -3.33a 
CFit*Executive directors     0.05 0.86 0.09 0.67 
CFit*Supervisory boards         -0.16 -2.49
b -0.41 -2.84a 
Di,t-1*Full structured regime   0.19 1.96
b -0.05 -0.64 0.11 1.80c 
Di,t-1*Voluntary structured regime   -0.38 -1.64
c -0.55 -3.01a -0.42 -2.40b 
Di,t-1*Mitigated structured regime   -0.50 -0.78 -0.84 -2.30
b -0.11 -0.23 
CFit*Full structured regime   0.01 0.90 -0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -1.38 
CFit*Voluntary structured regime   0.04 1.56 0.02 0.71 -0.02 -0.63 
CFit*Mitigated structured regime     -0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.43 -0.02 -0.10 
Di,t-1*Preference shares   -0.64 -35.83
a -0.62 -49.36a -0.63 -62.14a 
Di,t-1*Priority shares   -0.20 -1.06 -0.28 -1.47 -0.41 -2.34
b 
Di,t-1*Certificates   -0.08 -0.29 -0.60 -1.83
c -0.32 -1.11 
CFit*Preference shares   0.00 0.20 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.41 
CFit*Priority shares   0.06 2.76
a 0.06 2.45b 0.06 2.44b 
CFit*Certificates     0.01 0.12 0.05 1.23 0.06 1.41 
Firm size*1000 -5.52 -1.51 9.01 1.22 6.99 1.12 5.65 1.27 
Leverage*1000 37.69 0.97 -49.52 -1.47 -43.88 -1.51 -42.49 -1.66c 
Tobin's Q*1000 4.08 0.66 -2.21 -0.61 -0.65 -0.34 -0.94 -0.73 
Intercept 92044 1.60 -104220 -1.10 -77034 -0.97 -61429 -1.10 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 962 962 962 962 
No. of firms 150 150 150 150 
F-test (2) >0.001 >0.001 >0.001 >0.001 
Hansen test 125.01 2.9e+08a 3.50e+06a 1.00e+11a 
AR(1) test z-statistic -1.18 -1.19 -1.15 -1.15 
AR(2) test z-statistic 1.06 1.13 1.08 1.08 
 





Summary of the impact of shareholder power allocation on dividend policy 
 
This table presents a summary of dividend payout policy using the estimates of Table 7. 
For each of the statistically significant parameter estimates, we show the estimated size of 
the deviations from the reference values. In Panel B, the significance of the change in the 
target payout ratio is obtained using Wald tests which determine whether the deviations 
from 1 and 2 are jointly significant. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Nss stands for ‘not statistically significant’. 
 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of dividend payout 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Voting power measure 
Expected 
sign % shares % shares Banzhaf  % shares 
Shareholder power 
restrictions controlled for   No Yes Yes Yes 
Largest shareholder   nss nss   
2nd largest shareholder   nss nss     
Financial institutions  +   1.74b 3.08a 
Individuals  -   nss nss 
Government  +   nss nss 
Non-financial firms  -   1.18c nss 
Executive Directors  -   1.49c nss 
Supervisory boards  -      1.89c nss 
 
 
Panel B: Dividend dynamics 
      
Dividend smoothing: 1 
  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
Voting power measure 
Expected 
sign % shares % shares Banzhaf % shares 
Shareholder power 
restrictions controlled for   No Yes Yes Yes 
Largest shareholder -  -0.60c nss     
2nd largest shareholder + -4.49b nss     
Financial institutions -   nss -1.08a 
Individuals -   nss nss 
Government +   nss nss 
Non-financial firms -   nss -1.44c 
Executive Directors -   -1.04b -1.73b 
Supervisory boards -   0.49c 1.37b 
       
Target payout ratio: 2/(1-1) 
  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
Voting power measure 
Expected 
sign % shares % shares Banzhaf % shares 
Shareholder power 
restrictions controlled for   No Yes Yes Yes 
Largest shareholder - -72.5%b nss     
2nd largest shareholder + -48.1%b nss     
Financial institutions 0   nss 23.2%a 
Individuals -   nss nss 
Government +   nss nss 
Non-financial firms -   nss -17.1%b 
Executive Directors -   13.7%b 10.1%b 
Supervisory boards -   nss 26.3%c 
 






The impact of shareholder power restrictions and the allocation of shareholder power on Tobin’s Q 
 
The table contains random-effects models, where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market-to-book ratio. Return on 
assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to the average of total assets at the beginning and the end of the year. Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of firm value i.e. the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt at the end of a given year. The book value 
of leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book value of the total assets and is measured at the end of the year. All values are in  
thousands at constant 2004 prices. The construction of the Banzhaf power indices is explained in Section 3.2. The z-statistics are 
computed using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Voting power measure     % of Shares Banzhaf index % of Shares 
Variables Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
Intercept -2.05 -4.03a -1.87 -3.61a -2.39 -4.35a -1.98 -3.58a -2.30 -4.37a 
Return of assets (ROA) 0.60 2.65a 0.58 2.58a 0.55 2.47b 0.57 2.48b 0.52 2.23b 
Firm size 0.24 7.31a 0.26 7.49a 0.27 7.87a 0.26 7.66a 0.26 7.93a 
Leverage -1.02 -4.56a -1.01 -4.54a -1.07 -4.76a -1.03 -4.60a -1.13 -5.00a 
Full structured regime -0.32 -1.88c -0.24 -1.36 -0.21 -1.19 -0.16 -0.94 -0.19 -1.15 
Voluntary structured regime -0.20 -0.89 -0.15 -0.64 -0.11 -0.49 -0.11 -0.48 -0.09 -0.41 
Mitigated structured regime 0.65 1.90c 0.57 1.65c 0.49 1.40 0.58 1.73c 0.50 1.54 
Preference shares   -0.33 -1.98b -0.30 -1.79c -0.28 -1.69c -0.29 -1.85c 
Priority shares   -0.07 -0.41 -0.05 -0.29 -0.06 -0.37 -0.02 -0.13 
Certificates     -0.08 -0.48 0.12 0.69 -0.08 -0.39 0.12 0.73 
Largest shareholder     0.61 2.59a      
2nd largest shareholder         0.46 0.93         
Financial institutions       -0.15 -0.76 0.52 1.86c 
Individuals       0.33 1.20 0.84 1.73c 
Government       -0.23 -0.43 0.00 0.00 
Non-financial firms       0.10 0.46 0.49 1.89c 
Executive Directors       0.23 0.96 0.82 2.05b 
Supervisory boards             0.02 0.06 0.81 1.62 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 962 962 962 962 962 
No. of firms 150 150 150 150 150 
Wald test 326.29a 331.04a 340.61a 343.57a 349.21a 
Sigma u 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.70 
Sigma e 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Rho  0.54 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.49 
 
